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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union and the United States are currently negotiating the biggest bilateral free 
trade agreement. Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) or also known as Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) originates from a long-lasting economic partnership 
between the EU and the US that stretches back more than a century ago. Since their 
formalized cooperation took place, both regions have been trying to ease the trade exchange 
mainly through the cutting of tariffs. For the last decade, however, the EU and the US have 
been losing their leading position in the world trade. Thus, willingness to deeper transatlantic 
trade liberalization has been one of the strongest drivers of bilateral (FTA) initiatives. This time, 
though, lowering tariffs would not play any significant role, as they are already at their 
minimum. As the empirical study conducted by CEPR (2013) shows, by reducing only tariff 
barriers the expected gains for both economies would be rather negligible. On the other hand, 
it was found that non-tariff barriers (NTBs), emerging from regulatory differences across the 
countries, create the most significant impediment in the transatlantic trade and investment 
relations. Therefore, NTBs reduction and harmonization of standards are regarded to be the 
key elements of the new bilateral FTA – the TTIP agreement. Regulations on both sides of 
Atlantic, however, cannot be simply removed since many of them have been established to 
serve legitimate domestic purposes. Thus, bearing this in mind, both NTBs differences across 
many sectors and an incompatible regulatory approach between the EU and the US refer to 
the most sensitive areas in the TTIP negotiations. Even though the negotiations have not been 
finished yet and the final decisions and results may still change, this paper is going to tackle a 
set of following questions:  
Why the EU and the US have initiated the TTIP agreement just recently and what could have 
been the reasons for it? Which were the underlying studies analysing the effect of TTIP on 
economies? What econometric models have been used? Are their findings reliable? What the 
alternative analysis suggest concerning the potential impact of TTIP? What are the most 
challenging regulations in the negotiations? Why is TTIP regarded as a living agreement? 
Which will be the scope of TTIP’s horizontal regulatory cooperation chapter? How this system 
will be designed, operated and by whom? What kind of investment protection standards will 
be embedded in TTIP? What about the transparency of the TTIP negotiations? And, finally, 
what is public general opinion about the agreement? 
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2. The evolution of international trade theories 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the fundamental theoretical framework on international 
trade theories. Moreover, the second part is going to provide with a guide through the history 
of theories of economic integration. 
To start with, it is essential to outline the important role of scientific theories. It is generally 
accepted that major decisions in human’s history have been based upon scientific theories and 
profound econometrics models. Their intention is to predict a future behaviour or to measure 
a probability of an outcome, in order to eliminate a potential risk that may occur in future. One 
of the most important area, in which the establishment of fundamental theories is essential, 
regards international trade. 
The mainstream theory throughout 16th century to 18th century was Mercantilism. It was 
believed that prosperity of the nation depends on the encouraging export and collecting 
precious metal in return while discouraging import through use of tariffs. In terms of 
international trade, Mercantilism theory estimates that a gain by one nation result in a loss of 
another. Thus, the main goal was to achieve a “favourable” proportion between export and 
import by adopting protection policies. Such policies that would bring gold and silver into the 
country as well as maintain domestic employment (Zhang, 2008). Nonetheless, this system 
was beneficial exclusively for the rulers, but not for the consumers. Citizens mostly struggled 
with the high duties on imported goods. In late 18th century classical economist Adam Smith 
(1776) started to criticize Mercantilism. In his book, The Wealth of Nations, he explained that 
the wealth of a nation is not reflected by its treasure but rather by its productive capacity. He 
claimed that international trade is beneficial for all participants. Moreover, he argued that 
economy of scale that is beneficial in terms of lower costs, and can be achieved by 
specialization and labour division. His theory of absolute advantage is based on assumption 
that country should specialise in production of goods in which it has absolute advantage i.e. 
producing goods in which the country is most efficient and trade for those goods in which is 
not efficient. Adam Smith and David Ricardo are considered to be the fathers of classical theory 
of international trade (Zhang, 2008). 
The Ricardian model (1817) is based on comparative advantage (in so called opportunity 
costs) and gains from trade. In particular, Ricardo reasoned that the substantial variables in 
international trade are technology and costs of production. His model of comparative 
advantage stands on assumption that a country should focus on producing those goods in 
which is relatively more cost-efficient and productive than other country. This is the simplest 
underlying assumption of classical model and differ from neoclassical trade models in that it 
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only regards one factor of production.  Ricardo showed that industry specialization (that leads 
to low-cost production) along with free international market will always conduce to positive 
result. Nevertheless, it is argued that Ricardo did not provide a detailed explanation why a 
particular nation possess a comparative advantage in a specific product. (Zhang, 2008, pp. 2-
5).   
Subsequent leading international trade theory was developed within a neo-classical framework 
by Swedish economics Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin. This theory is superior to Richardian 
theory of comparative advantage. Heckscher-Ohlin model introduces a second factor ‘capital’, 
so that this model considers two production factors – ‘labour and capital’ – a basic assumption 
of neo-classical macroeconomic model. It contributes to Ricardian theory and gave explanation 
why a nation possess comparative advantage in certain commodity. Heckscher-ohlin theory 
(1933) is based on assumption that two countries are identical apart from the difference in 
relative factor endowments (labour or capital). The country that is relatively richer in capital - 
capital-abundant country - will produce capital-intensive goods at lower costs than a labour-
abundant country, and vice-versa. Thus, "a capital-abundant country will export the capital-
intensive good, while the labour-abundant country will export the labour-intensive good." (B. 
Ohlin, 1933).  This model has been one of the basic models of comparative advantage in 
modern economics. However, it was pointed out that Wassily Leontief, in a 1953 article, 
published data that undermined this theory. Consequently, in early 1960’s a new theory was 
necessary to be established to give an insight into the trade pattern that could no longer be 
explained on the basis of earlier theories (Zhang, 2008, pp. 5-10). 
To sum up the (neo)classical international trade theories, it is suggested that every country 
has a comparative advantage over others, therefore, one country could produce a commodity 
at lower cost than other country. Such comparative advantages stem from the factor 
endowment – abundant natural resources, climate or labour. Furthermore, specialization and 
labour division could further contribute to a comparative advantage. Hence, it should be the 
country’s main goal to specialize in certain goods and trade those goods for others. 
Nevertheless, in late 70’s a peculiar international trade pattern took place. Countries that 
produced similar commodities kept on trading with one another, in spite of the fact that they 
had ‘nothing’ to gain. Thus, traditional ‘old’ theories were no longer able to explain these 
changes.  As a consequence, a group of economists challenged traditional view on 
international trade and it gave a rise to creation of New Trade Theory. 
New Trade Theory (NTT) has a revolutionary conception of international trade. The NTT is 
built upon traditional models of comparative advantage. Moreover, it assumes certain 
elements, particularly, increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and product 
8 | P a g e  
 
differentiation, which were not reflected in classical ‘old’ trade theories. NTT highlights that 
comparative advantage does not just stem from the factor endowment but rather, from the 
economies of scale and network effects that are considered as substantial determinants of 
international trade patterns. Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize laureate from 2008, pointed out that 
it is in countries’ best interest to specialize on production of certain goods and thus attain the 
economy of scale in those goods – the higher rate of production the lower costs are achieved. 
It was emphasized that narrow market specialization will result in decline of spectrum of goods 
at national level. Therefore, this pattern creates an incentive for countries to be engaged in 
international trade in order to increase variety of goods at consumer level. At global level, 
though, the spectrum of products decrease since the individual countries are more specialized 
on particular products. This theory further suggests that economy of scale is more easily 
attainted by early market entrants, since they have the time advantage in order to adapt to 
market conditions. Therefore, Krugman was convinced that newly emerging industries in 
developing countries are likely to have difficulties in currently established global market. 
Furthermore, NTT opposes the traditional wisdom of unlimited free trade and suggests a more 
complex view. It highlights the important role of government and the establishment of 
regulations. Krugman emphasizes the crucial need to protect the emerging industries 
particularly by such tools as domestic subsidy, export subsidy or temporary tariffs. As a result, 
it could enhance the efforts of the domestic industries to attain the economies of scale, and 
thus, a better competitive position at the global market could be obtained (Krugman P., 1994, 
pp. 1-8).  
Taking into account the EU-US trade environment from the standpoint of competitiveness, 
development stage and production and trade structure, it has been concluded that New Trade 
Theory explicitly appears to be the theoretical ground to explain and analyse the new free trade 
agreement between the European Union and the United States - Transatlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA) or Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Sorhun, 2014, 
pp. 288).  Moreover, it was stressed that similar size of economies plays an important role for 
the potential members of economic bloc. As the empirical evidence suggests, the greater 
economic size discrepancies among the cooperating regions, the lower potential gains from 
the economic integration are generated. The US and the EU economic size is similar, 
considering EU as a whole. For this reason, the EU should act as a united entity in order to 
obtain greater economic gain from TTIP (Sorhun, 2014, pp. 288-289).  
The classical and modern theories play critical role in deepening and liberalizing trade. As a 
consequence of more integrated economies, the international trade has witnessed a significant 
growth over the last decades. Trade liberalization can take several forms.  
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According to Balassa, who is considered as one of the main authors in this area, Economic 
Integration (EI) can be defined as “the abolition of discrimination within an area” (Balassa, 
1961, p. 1). In his seminar work, The Theory of Economic Integration (Balassa, 1961), it is 
described as a process and a state of affairs. As far as the process is concerned, it comprises 
of measures designed to abolish discrimination between different states. Regarding the state 
of affairs, it encompass the absence of different forms of discrimination between national 
economies.  In this definition of EI, the process is characterised as a dynamic concept while 
the state of affairs is viewed as a static concept (Balassa, 1961, p. 1). It is vital to note that the 
definition of EI may vary among the scholars. For instance, in Kahnert’s opinion it is a “process 
of removing progressively those discriminations which occur at national borders” (Kahnert, 
1969). Furthermore, Balassa (1961) pointed out that there is a discrepancy between economic 
integration and economic cooperation. He defines cooperation as an action that aims to lessen 
discrimination, whereas process of economic integration “comprises measures that entail the 
suppression of some forms of discrimination” (Balassa, 1961, pp. 2). Consequently, measures 
that only decrease discrimination among countries cannot be regarded as economic 
integration but rather economic cooperation (Balassa, 1961, pp. 2). 
Balassa (1961) classifies different forms of EI depending on the degree of integration. He 
distinguishes five fundamental stages of EI – free-trade area, customs union, common market, 
economic union, and complete economic integration. The forms of economic integration have 
evolving characteristics – a higher form of EI encompass both all characteristics of the lower 
stage of EI and new elements that expand the scope and content of the integration process 
(Balassa, 1961). In essence, higher stages can be viewed as progress in the integration 
process aiming its ultimate goal (depending on the desire of the participating countries) to 
achieve full integration - common monetary, social and economic policies and supranational 
institutions whose decisions are binding on member-states (Marinov, 2014, pp. 364-365).  
 
Moreover, regarding evolving characteristics of integration, a higher form of integration regards 
lower level of national sovereignty for the participating countries. This sovereignty is given to 
the hands of central supranational authority. In other words, supranational authority in 
advanced form of EI possess more power than in the lower form. Although the economic 
integration is defined as a gradual process, it is believed that countries can start their 
integration from one of the higher levels, depending on their objectives (Marinov, 2014, pp. 
365). 
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It is also worthy to note that current literature does not provide a consensus in the exact number 
of development forms of EI. This paper is going to provide a classification that includes six 
fundamental stages. Their content and description are mainly based on Balassa’s approach.  
 
According to Panagariya (2000), the first and the lowest form of integration is regarded the 
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). The underlying characteristic of this form of arrangement 
is that tariffs imposed on specific goods produced in the member countries are lower than on 
those produced outside the union. (Panagariya, 2000, pp. 288).  
 
Free-trade area (FTA) is a PTA in which tariffs are eliminated entirely within the union. 
(Panagariya, 2000, pp. 288). Particularly, not only tariffs are abandoned but also quantitative 
restrictions (quotas) between the participating countries are abolished on the goods produced 
within the union. Nonetheless, each country keeps its own tariffs to the trade with non-
members (Balassa, 1961, pp. 2). FTA is defined in paragraph (8) of article (XXIV) of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT, 1994), as follows: “A free-trade area shall be 
understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce… are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories” (GATT, 1994, pp. 792).  
 
A Customs Union (CU) may be regarded as a further integrated FTA. It involves, besides the 
elements of FTA, an abolition of discrimination, in the terms of commodity movement and 
common external tariff on a good imported from non-members countries. This common 
external tariff is likely differ across goods but not across union partners. GATT (1994), 
paragraph (8) of article (XXIV), defines CU as follows:  “A customs union shall be understood 
to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so 
that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce… are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at least with respect 
to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and, (ii)… substantially 
the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the 
union to the trade of territories not included in the union” (GATT, 1994, pp. 792). 
 
The next step in EI is attained in a Common Market (CM). CM therefore involves all 
characteristics of CU and, in addition to that, it allows free movement of labour and capital 
among member nations. In order to achieve a CM, it is substantial for its members to remove 
all trade barriers (including non-tariff barriers). Thus, physical (borders), technical (standards) 
and fiscal (taxes) barriers are diminished at maximum extent among the members of CM. 
11 | P a g e  
 
Moreover, it is necessary for the Member states to have a certain degree of coordination of 
some of the economic policies (J.P.C. Bento, 2009). 
 
A deeper form of EI is regarded as Economic union. It “combines the suppression of restrictions 
on commodity and factor policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities 
in these policies” (Balassa, 1961, pp. 2). The ultimate goal of the Economic union is the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It encompass unified monetary and fiscal policies that 
are supervised by central authority. Moreover, the members of economic union use the same 
currency and apply the same monetary policy (J.P.C. Bento, 2009) 
 
The highest form of EI, according to Balassa (1961), is a complete economic integration where 
all the members become literally one nation. In this stage supra-national authority, whose 
decisions are binding for member states, possess the sovereignty of nation’s government and 
controls unified policies, in particular monetary, fiscal, social, and anti-cyclical policies 
(Balassa, 1961, pp. 3; J.P.C. Bento, 2009, pp.4). “The formulation and implementation of 
economic policy is an exclusive competence of the institutions of the integration community”. 
(Marinov, 2014, pp. 369) 
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3. A Brief Outlook on EU-US Partnership 
 
The long-standing partnership between the European Union and United States stretches 
back to 1953, when the first diplomatic relationship was established. Nevertheless, it was 
only on 27th November 1990 when the ‘Transatlantic Declaration’ - which for the first time 
formalized EU-US cooperation - was signed. Since then, a sustained political dialogue and 
regular summit meetings between the leaders of European Community and the United States 
began. Their cooperation addressed such areas as on the economy, education, science, and 
culture. Further step in EU-US bilateral collaboration emerged in 1995 when the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was launched. NTA objectives encompassed four main areas: 
promoting peace and stability; sustaining democracy and development around the world; 
responding to global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer 
economic relations; and building bridges across the Atlantic. Subsequently, on 18 May 1998 
at the London EU-US Summit, a new initiative to create the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) was launched. The main goals of TEP were to intensify and extend 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation and common actions in the field of trade and 
investment. Under TEP, EU-US agreed to remove technical barriers to trade by mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment, and to work together on custom procedures (EC, 
2006). Later on, in 2007, within the framework of the NTA and in line with the TEP, the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) was established in order to intensify transatlantic 
economic integration, improve competitiveness and achieve bilateral economic convergence 
of both partners the EU and the US (The White House, 2014; USEU, 2015). At the present 
time the TEC is the only EU-US high level forum where the economic issues can be discussed 
in a coherent and coordinated manner. Herein, the Members of the European Commission and 
US Cabinet Members are brought together in order to discuss strategic global economic 
questions and closer EU-US economic ties. In November 2011, at the EU-US summit meeting, 
TEC established a particular group called High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 
(HLWG) that is governed by the EU Trade Commissioner and the US Trade Representative 
(EC, 2015). The major purpose of HLWG was to identify the policies and measures that would 
contribute to an increase of trade and investments, and to attain job creation, economic growth, 
and international competitiveness. According to its final report from 13th February 2013, the 
HLWG, after considering various scenarios, came into conclusion that the most significant 
mutual benefit would be achieved by a comprehensive, ambitious agreement that would 
address a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues - including regulatory issues- 
that could contribute to the development of global rules (HLWG report, 2013). In February 
2013, the EU presidents (European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European 
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Commission President José Manuel Barroso) and the US president (Barack Obama) endorsed 
recommendations of the HLWG and announced to start necessary procedures in order to 
launch negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (MEMO, 
2013). When the negotiations are completed, the EU-US agreement would be the biggest 
bilateral FTA ever negotiated. 
 
4. EU-US position in world market 
 
The mutual trade between the EU and the US is the largest bilateral trade relationship which 
enjoys the most integrated economic relationship in the world.  The data revealed by European 
Commission (EC), in 2015, showed that the total US investment in the EU is three times higher 
than in all of Asia; EU investment in the US is around eight times the amount of EU investment 
in India and China together; and the EU and the US economies account together for about half 
the entire world GDP and for nearly one third of world trade flows (EC, 2015) 
Nevertheless, according to the EC working document (EC-SWD 69, 2013) it was emphasized 
that the relative share of total trade of these two economies has been on decline over the last 
decade (EC-SWD 69, 2013). 
Figure 1 – Relative Market Share in % of world total, 1999-2013  
 
Source: EC-ECFIN, March 2015 
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The chart depicts a significant decline of the EU and the US relative market share concerning 
the world market. In the decade preceding the crisis, the EU experienced relatively stable 
market shares, fluctuating around 20 per cent between 2000 and 2007. However, the severe 
consequences of the crisis constituted a significant loss of the EU market share. The drop of 
the EU market share, shortly after the crisis, was much greater than in the case of the US.  In 
contrast, the US had already lost significant export market shares before the crisis in the period 
of 2000-2007. The US market share has been relatively stable after the crisis hit, in 2009, 
hovering around 10 per cent. Japan’s market share has similar nature to that of the US. China, 
on the other hand, after the initial period of opening up has strengthen its position on the global 
market and become more competitive. For more than a decade, China has been gaining 
significant market shares mainly at the expense of the US and Japan and has become one of 
the major global players. Moreover, its growth was not significantly affected by the global crisis 
(EC-ECFIN, March 2015). 
 
5. Towards TTIP 
 
As the brief history outlook in the third chapter outlined the EU and the US have been 
undergoing incremental integration for more than 60 years. By virtue of their mutual effort, both 
regions became the biggest economic powers in the world. Nonetheless, due to the growing 
economic power of China and other faster-growing emerging economies the global economic 
power in the last decade has been shifting away from the advanced western economies (Cox 
M., 2012), as portrayed in the Figure 1. Therefore, we can assume that both the European 
Union and the United States have common incentive for deeper integration that might 
contribute to an increase of relative share in the world trade. At the same time, it can be argued 
that both partners have viewed an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement as a rational 
further step in the EU-US integration process.  
With the aim to facilitate the integration process, in April 2007, The Transatlantic Economic 
Council (TEC) was established to guide and stimulate the work on transatlantic economic 
convergence. TEC fosters ongoing economic cooperation activities in areas of mutual interest 
as well as it works as a platform to ensure a political guidance and directions (EC, 2013). Since 
the work of TEC started, there have been published several economic studies that analyse the 
economic nature on both sides of Atlantic. These studies tried to find out what create the most 
substantial impediment in bilateral EU-US relationship, as well as to suggest the best 
alternative that would accelerate their mutual trade and investment flows.  
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The first key econometric study was published, in December 2009, by Ecorys (2009). Its 
research was founded by EC (Ecorys, 2009, pp i). It was stated that although economic 
relationship between the EU and the US are among the most open in the world, “various non-
tariff measures (NTMs) on both sides of the Atlantic continue to hinder the emergence of a 
truly free transatlantic market and constitute important impediments to greater transatlantic 
trade and investment flows”. The published report - ‘Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and 
Investment – An Economic Analysis’ (Ecorys, 2009) - identifies NTMs and regulatory 
divergences between the EU and the US constitute important impediment in their mutual trade. 
The paper considers economic potential of both regions that could be attained by reduction of 
NTMs and better aligning regulations across the Atlantic.  
In an effort to examine the potential effects of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), TTIP have been accompanied by series of econometric studies aiming to 
project net economic gain for all countries involved. Likewise Ecorys (2009), studies that were 
conducted in following years by Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, 2013), Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII, 2013) and Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (2013), highlighted that the Non-tariff barriers (NTB) are currently the basic obstacle 
in the EU-US economic relationship.   
All four above noted studies estimate that a new kind of FTA between the EU and the US, 
which particularly addresses non-tariff barriers reduction and harmonization of regulations and 
standards, would deliver considerable benefits for both partners.  
In particular, the empirical study called ‘Reducing Trans-Atlantic Barriers to Trade and 
Investment’ conducted by CEPR (2013) is considered to be a cornerstone of the TTIP 
agreement. With regard to TTIP negotiations, papers released by European Commission 
primarily refer to the CEPR’s report (2013) and its findings. CEPR is regarded as a leading 
independent pan-European economic research organization. Substantial part of this analysis 
originates from the empirical study published by Ecorys in 2009. CEPR (2013) has taken into 
consideration two scenarios: first, reducing specific tariffs; second, ambitious comprehensive 
trade and investment liberalization. The results showed that the second scenario - the 
comprehensive complete tariff removal and harmonization of regulations and standards - 
would bring greater benefits to both economies. It is also vital to note that the researchers from 
CEPR admitted it has been a very challenging task to precisely estimate the hypothesis 
benefits that TTIP would bring, as it is extremely ambitious and comprehensive FTA aiming to 
integrate two biggest economies in the world. (CEPR, 2013).  
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6. Regulatory coherence 
 
Indeed, TTIP is a new kind of FTA that primarily focuses on reduction of NTBs. In Ecorys 
(2009) study, non-tariff barriers are defined as “all non-price and non-quantity restrictions on 
trade in goods, services and investment, at federal and state level. This includes border 
measures (customs procedures, etc.) as well as behind-the border measures flowing from 
domestic laws, regulations and practices” (Ecorys, 2009, pp. xiii). Unlike traditional NTBs (such 
as import quotas), different regulations (e.g. chemicals in cosmetics, car safety or food safety) 
contribute to the rise of production-cost for foreign firms resulting from different and mostly 
expensive reconfiguration of products for export. In this regard, it can negatively affect foreign 
firms in terms of market concentration and economic power (CEPR, 2013, pp.16).  
It should be stressed that many regulations cannot be simply removed by the reason that they 
serve legitimate domestic purposes. Nevertheless, it is argued that the potential benefits of 
TTIP will be substantial, and hence, “the costs involved may still be mitigated or reduced 
through partial regulatory convergence and cross-recognition of standards” (CEPR, 2013, pp. 
9). Once the regulations between the EU and the US are more compatible the transaction 
costs will be reduced. Accordingly, firms will meet easily all the necessary requirements for 
shipping commodities over Atlantic. They will be able to obtain new customers as well as to 
expand their businesses. It is suggested that this will lead to growth creating, new jobs and 
higher wages. EC also supposes that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) “will be among 
the biggest beneficiaries, since they are disproportionately affected by regulatory barriers to 
trade” (EC-TTIP and Regulations, 2015, pp. 4). Moreover, it is suggested that TTIP will 
contribute to wider range of products for customers on both sides of Atlantic. Finally, it is 
believed that a closer cooperation between the EU and the US could lead to the development, 
update and implementation of international regulation and standards (EC-TTIP and 
Regulations, 2015).  
Even though the EC proclaims that “both sides have some of the highest quality regulation in 
the world, managed by some of the most qualified experts” (EC-TTIP and Regulations, 2015, 
pp. 5) many concerns about the ‘regulatory convergence’ and ‘regulatory cooperation’ have 
been expressed among civil society organizations and general public. Such concerns stem 
from the fact that there are significant discrepancies between the American and the European 
regulations and generally accepted standards. Therefore, many consumer groups and 
independent studies fear that the attempts to convergent regulations will contribute to a 
potential welfare loss to society, to the extent that this elimination threatens public policy goals 
(e.g. consumer safety, public health, environmental safety) (OFSE, 2014, pp. IV). Nonetheless, 
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the EC re-assures that the protectionism of citizens will not be diminished in favour of trade. 
Consequently, it was stressed that in areas where the EU and the US has different approaches 
to regulations “it is not possible to make the systems compatible, because we have [implying 
the EU] taken different democratic decisions through our legislative processes about what 
rules are right for our societies” (EC-TTIP and Regulations, 2015, pp.6). 
 
6.1 Divergent regulatory regimes 
The following subchapters are going to introduce some of the most striking examples of 
different regulations and standards between the EU and the US that have been accompanied 
with social distemper since the TTIP negotiations begun. Particularly three EU-US regulations 
are going to highlighted and discussed in detail.  
It is argued that legislative frameworks between the EU and the US in terms of underlying 
values and approach differ considerably. For instance, regarding medical devices the US 
regulation imposes very strict requirements and a great pre and post marketing surveillance, 
while the EU regulation in this area is far behind. On the other hand, in the US there is no 
statutory recognition of privacy, whereas the EU regulation recognize data privacy as a 
fundamental right. Food and agriculture are another areas where the legislation frameworks 
between the EU and the US often differ significantly. The different approaches include hygiene 
and control system, labelling standards, basic cultural, ecological and ethical values. In 
contradiction to the US regulations, the European-ones strictly ban hormone-treated beef, 
chlorine-washed poultry or food products from cloned animals. In addition, while the US 
legislation do not require labelling of Genetically Modified (GM) food in most of its federal 
states, the EU consumers enjoy strict labelling of GM foods and ingredients (Cardoso and 
colleagues, 2013).  
 
6.1.1 Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) induce very controversial debate throughout the 
Europe. “GMOs are organisms whose genetic material has been modified artificially in order 
to give them new properties, such as resistance to droughts or insects” (EU-parliament, 2015). 
Both the US and the EU legislations allow Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) to be 
cultivated and used as feed and food in their territories. Even though accumulating data and 
extensive studies are pointing to the potential role of GMOs, either directly or indirectly, to be 
linked with the rise of chronic diseases further research is required (Diamanti-Kandarakis E., 
2009).  
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Despite the pronounced concerns about health, environmental and overall benefits/threats of 
GMOs they have been authorised and placed on market. The first GM maize ‘MON 810’ has 
been commercially cultivated in the EU since 1998. Nevertheless, in the last decade Europe 
has experienced significant decline in GMOs cultivation. Most of the EU Members, namely, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg and Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Italy have 
adopted safeguard measures prohibiting the cultivation of GMOs on their territories. Currently 
only the Monsanto GM maize, authorised in 1998, is grown on really small amount of hectares 
in just four European countries: Spain, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia 
(EU-Parliament, 2015). On the contrary, as the quantitative data of US Department of 
Agriculture shows, on average, in 2014, 93 per cent of biotech crops - in the area of 73.1 million 
hectares - cultivated in the US were classified as GMOs (USDA, 2014). Notwithstanding, 
despite the EU restrictions on GMOs cultivation it is essential to note that the Member States 
keep on importing GMOs, particularly soymeal and soybean. In 2013, 32 million tonnes of 
soymeal and soybean (96% of EU consumption from which 90% was GMOs origin) were 
imported to the EU, where most of it was used as a feed for livestock - please see also 
Appendix I (EC-GMOs, 2015).  
With regard to the TTIP negotiations, in February 2015, the EC stated that the legislation will 
not change in pursuit to make the systems more compatible, as the different democratic 
decisions about the rules have been taken through its legislative processes. Moreover, it was 
stated that EU basic law on GMOs is not up for negotiations (EC-TTIP and Regulations, 2015, 
pp. 5). Somewhat in contradictory to those statements, EC on its official website, regarding 
TTIP, proclaimed that “Regulators in the EU and US already exchange information about 
GMOs - on policy, regulations and technical issues. TTIP could help them do so more 
effectively. This would help limit the effect on trade of our different systems for approving 
GMOs” (EC-TTIP Questions and Answers, 2015). In addition, in April 2015, a new political 
agreement towards allowing Member States to restrict or ban GMOs cultivation in their territory 
was reached. This agreement shifts the responsibility - regarding GMOs cultivation – to the 
State level (EC-GMOs, 2015). In this concern, Marco Contiero, Greenpeace EU agriculture 
policy director, argues that this agreement has some major flaws: “It grants biotech companies 
the power to negotiate with elected governments and excludes the strongest legal argument 
to ban GM crops-evidence of environmental harm” (Greenpeace, 2015).  
 
6.1.2 Chemicals in cosmetics 
Regulatory systems between the EU and the US in this area are also rather different. European 
new regulation on cosmetic (including prohibited chemicals in cosmetics), which came into 
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force in 2013, defines a cosmetic in a very broad spectrum. Thereby, there exist so many 
categories of products that fit into this regulation. On the contrary, the US exercises different 
system where the category of cosmetic is quite narrow one. For instance, Over-The-Counter 
drugs (OTC), in which category falls also toothpaste or sunscreens, are not considered as 
cosmetics (Euroactive, 2014; BEUC, 2014). Furthermore, in comparison of prohibited or 
restricted substances and ingredients used in cosmetics the EU has remarkably higher safety 
standards than its counterpart the US. According to the EC regulation, the EU prohibits 1378 
chemical substances that cannot be used in cosmetics products (see the list of substances on 
EC-Cosmetics, 2015). On the other hand, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2015) 
prohibits or restricts only 11 substances that cannot be used in cosmetics products (see the 
list of substances on FDA, 2015). As a consequence, a mutual recognition of standards and 
regulatory convergence in this area come to be seen as inconceivable.  
The primary goal of TTIP, however, is a mutual recognition of standards and regulatory 
coherence, and this area has not been an exception. As The European Consumer 
Organization (BEUC) revealed, in the first EC - Position paper on Cosmetics published in May 
2014, the primary idea of TTIP was to promote regulatory convergence in the cosmetics sector. 
This particularly implied that TTIP could cover “Mutual recognition of lists of substances that 
can be used in cosmetic products (positive lists) and of lists of substances that are prohibited 
or restricted in cosmetic products (negative list)” (BEUC, 2014). Nonetheless, BEUC stated 
after repeated appeals by public interest organisations and media reporting on allowing mutual 
recognition of systems and thereby accepting banned chemicals in cosmetics, the EU position 
paper on chemicals in cosmetics has been altered. Public interest organisations highlighted 
that mutual recognition would be major threat to the EU’s cosmetic safety regulatory 
framework. After protracted negotiations the position of EU on cosmetics has changed. The 
major change in the new EU position on cosmetics in TTIP, from March 2015, implies that 
there is no longer a reference to the feasibility of ‘mutual recognition’ of lists of banned and 
authorised substances in cosmetics (BEUC, 2014). Nevertheless, as long as the negotiations 
are not completed, the final outcome is not guaranteed. 
 
 
6.1.3 Data Flows and Data Protection 
In last couple of months the issues considering data flows, data protection and privacy have 
drawn a lot of concerns and attention in Europe. The highest cross-border data flows in the 
world take place between the EU and US – 50% of total world data flows, therefore this 
component is just as substantial in TTIP negotiation as the trade of physical goods. In essence, 
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cross-border data flows might be viewed as a form of services or goods that can be purchased 
on international market. This can include a wide range of services from finance to consulting, 
from software and apps to intellectual property rights. It is stressed that as a result of removing 
non-tariff barriers through regulatory convergence the trade in digital goods and services will 
sharply increase by making flows between the different parties more fluid and more transparent 
(Thieulin and colleagues, 2013). Consequently, “access to the Internet and the ability to move 
data freely across borders increases the productivity of businesses and reduces trade costs, 
thereby creating economic growth and jobs” (Meltzer, 2014, pp. 1).  
It is important to emphasize, however, that free flows of information across the Atlantic, from 
which all parties benefit, should never be mixed up with the flow of commercially valuable 
personal information. Nowadays, consumers are subject to increased tracking and commercial 
surveillance as they move through their online and offline worlds. Extensive online tracking 
enables a creation of enormous personal profiles that can potentially compromise individual 
privacy and security. This is a subject of the regulatory framework on data protection and 
privacy. The EU and the US protection regimes, however, are thoroughly different. In the US 
there are currently no comprehensive data protection laws (BEUC-Data Flows, 2015). On the 
other hand, privacy in the EU is a fundamental right - “under EU law, personal data can only 
be gathered legally under strict conditions, for a legitimate purpose”. Moreover, the EU is 
currently undergoing a comprehensive reform of data protection rules that should be 
completed in the course of 2015 (EC-Data Protection, 2015).   
TTIP should be used as a vehicle to accelerate maximum interoperability between the EU and 
the US systems. Nevertheless, it is argued that in such sensitive areas like privacy protection, 
a broad trade agreement is not a correct framework. It has been underscored that in this 
context a specific agreement on data protection is necessary (Cardoso and colleagues, 2013). 
Therefore, it was emphasized by BEUC (2015) that the EU and the US should discuss common 
data privacy standards outside of the proposed TTIP negotiations (BEUC-Data Flows, 2015). 
 
7. Regulatory Cooperation - Horizontal Chapter 
 
While the above noted EU-US regulatory coherence is a part of TTIP negotiations that address 
the reinforcement of comprehension, trust and confidence in the domestic rule-making 
procedures between the two partners, the regulatory cooperation part aims to set up 
obligations that are generally respected and applied by all regulatory agencies on the both 
sides of Atlantic. This will be a new mechanism that is set to ensure awareness of both sides 
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about the implications of proposals and decisions on the other transatlantic partner (Chase 
and Pelkams, 2015). While writing this section, only one party, the EU, has publicly exposed 
its text proposal for the ‘Horizontal’ (cross sectorial) chapter on Regulatory Cooperation - an 
innovative approach to international regulatory cooperation. 
Whilst the proposed texts of the US remain a secret, a sketch of the US position on regulatory 
cooperation has been outlined on its official website of US Trade Representatives (USTR, 
2015). According to this draft the US primarily focuses on the promotion of greater 
transparency, participation and accountability in the development of regulations. This 
essentially means “applying the US system of public online consultations and other 
administrative review processes to all EU primary and secondary law making, including for the 
national laws of the 28 EU member countries” (TACD, 2015). It is also believed that embracing 
sound regulatory objectives in TTIP will not only put this two economies closer together, but 
may serve as a positive example for third-country markets around the world (USTR, 2015). 
In the European Union, on 10 February 2015, an introduction to the first legal text on regulatory 
cooperation was revealed by the EC. During the 9th round of TTIP negotiations, which took 
place in April 2015, EU Commission’s initial proposal on regulatory cooperation was submitted 
and came in public on 4 May 2015. The EU proposal on regulatory cooperation covers only 
specific regulatory acts that have or may have a significant effect on EU–US trade or 
investment (EC-Regulatory Cooperation, 2015). Ultimate goal of this proposal is to set up a 
“new model of economic integration based on a permanent bilateral regulatory cooperation 
mechanism through horizontal provisions complemented by a number of specific commitments 
across sectors” (Alemanno A., 2015, pp. 7). These commitments largely focus on regulatory 
cooperation in areas of common interest. In order to frame such an enhanced regulatory 
cooperation the establishment of an institutional mechanism is inevitable. The overall aim of 
this new concept is to identify, facilitate and increase the level of future regulatory compatibility 
and convergence between the EU and the US, where feasible. “TTIP will therefore emerge as 
a ‘living agreement’ where new areas of cooperation can be identified without the need to re-
open the initial international agreement nor to modify each-others’ institutional frameworks” 
(Alemanno A., 2015, pp. 10). 
Once the TTIP negotiations are concluded, new objectives for future regulatory cooperation 
may be identified. For this reason, the EU proposal for permanent regulatory cooperation 
suggests that regulators should be flexible in order to identify new priorities for regulatory 
cooperation. The EU-US regulatory cooperation need to be conducted in transparent manners 
including stakeholders’ input. This can be achieved through the Annual Regulatory 
Cooperation Programme of the Regulatory Cooperation Body (see Articles 14 and 15 of EU-
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Proposal, 2015). The EU proposal for regulatory cooperation seeks to cover particularly two 
types of regulations (see Article 3 of EC-Proposal, 2015): (1) “that contain precise requirements 
on how products should be designed to be marketed and used in the EU or the US”; (2) “that 
provide specific conditions for the supply of services, including for example licenses or 
qualification of service providers” (EC-Regulatory Cooperation, 2015, pp. 5). 
The EU-US regulatory cooperation would be facilitated by application of ‘good regulatory 
policy’ instruments and practices such as early warning, early regulatory cooperation, 
stakeholder consultation, transparency, impact assessment of proposed regulation, etc. (see 
Articles 5-7 of EC-Proposal, 2015). By embedding for the first time good regulatory practices 
into their respective systems the likelihood of mutual convergence on both the existing and 
new important regulatory standards is elevated (Alemanno A., 2015, pp. 20). Moreover, their 
cooperation would be beneficial in terms of exchanging experiences. In order to produce more 
compatible regulations, the regulatory cooperation mechanism would be based on regulatory 
exchange practices. This is a model of voluntary cooperation based on common interest. The 
EC proposal suggests establishing of the so called ‘Focal Points’ – each party will establish its 
respective office that will act as facilitator in the process of exchanging information about 
envisaged and existing regulatory acts (see Article 8 of EC-Proposal, 2015). As a consequence 
of shared experience, in terms of regulations, a better outcome is expected when developing 
new regulations. In cases where there is no room for compatibility the exchange may conduce 
to, at least, clarifying the respective positions of regulators. In order to promote regulatory 
compatibility (Article 10 of EC-Proposal, 2015) the regulators would act at central level i.e. at 
the EU and US federal level. This would stimulate regulators to jointly assess appropriate 
concept to promote compatibility when developing new innovative regulations, for instance, on 
modern IT technologies or hybrid cars. 
It is essential to note that this proposal suggests that the new mechanism will foster the 
initiation of procedures that could result in a greater convergence, but not to predetermine any 
particular outcome. The final decision and the conclusions will be based on the joint 
assessment of the regulators concerned, providing that stakeholders’ position has been taken 
into consideration (see Article 15 of EC-Proposal, 2015). It should be emphasized that 
stakeholders’ participation is a crucial element of this proposal. In this concern, Alemanno, 
Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law and Risk Regulation, in his paper (Alemanno A., 2015, pp. 
12) claims that one of the driving forces of permanent negotiations will be stakeholders’ request 
on new regulations. This was underscored by the EC stating that “all stakeholders would be 
offered a way to submit observations and concrete suggestions to regulators which would be 
carefully examined by the sectorial working group in charge or directly by the Regulatory 
Cooperation Body (RCB)” (EC-Regulatory Cooperation, 2015, pp. 10). The RCB would most 
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probably be an institutional framework, as proposed by EU Commission. It would monitor the 
work done in sectors and identify new opportunities for cooperation. Moreover, the progress 
achieved in agreed cooperation programmes would be reported to the Joint Ministerial Body. 
The key function of the RCB would be to promote future regulatory compatibility and 
convergence between the EU and the US by providing guidance to the process of on-going 
interactive cooperation. This body would be composed of representatives of public bodies 
(high level representatives of the regulators and competent authorities from both sides as 
well as departments of general oversight and implementation). The RCB should 
proactively collaborate with stakeholders, including businesses, consumers, NGOs and 
trade unions. Nonetheless, it would have solely consultative role, and hence, regulatory or 
rule-making competences would remain in the hands of domestic regulatory and legislative 
bodies or institutions (see Article 14-16 of EC-proposal, 2015; and EC-Regulatory 
Cooperation, 2015, pp.11-12).  
The EC Proposal (2015) also envisages a wider international regulatory cooperation with the 
involvement of third countries. This could be accomplished through the establishment of an 
international fora that could lead to development and implementation of international 
instruments (see Article 13 of EC-Proposal, 2015).  
In reflection to this new complex mechanism, the EC assures that regulatory cooperation, as 
proposed by the EU, will not hamper or delay the process of adopting important measures and 
regulations – a sketch of the new complex regulatory mechanism has been drawn up by BEUC, 
see Appendix II. It was stated that “early cooperation and exchange of information can help 
regulators to be more effective and efficient from the start in achieving their objectives” (EC-
Regulatory Cooperation, 2015, pp. 10). Moreover, it was stressed that regulatory cooperation 
will not lead to future reductions in levels of protection as all the states will continue to regulate 
in accordance with their regulatory framework, procedures and principles (EC-Regulatory 
Cooperation, 2015).  
Nevertheless, Alemanno (2015) argues that if this new system is not carefully designed and 
thoughtfully handled, its ongoing function may rather “quickly turn into a plethora of additional 
advocacy avenues within the actual respective policymaking systems” (Alemanno A., 2015, 
pp. 20). Moreover, Chase and Pelkams (2015) pointed out that currently proposed texts on 
Horizontal cooperation do not refer to such essential tools as Regulatory Compatibility 
Assessments or/and the Regulatory Equivalence Assessments, in order to ensure informed 
decision-making without trying to predetermine the outcomes (Chase and Pelkams, 2015, pp. 
25-26). In addition, Alemanno (2015) is convinced that the major beneficiaries of the 
mechanisms of regulatory cooperation, are industry lobbies rather than civic advocates. He 
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also critically views this innovative governance mechanism as a tool that inevitably ‘reopen’ 
the legislative and rulemaking processes. Thus, TTIP “horizontal coherence chapter – due to 
the commitment to the promotion of regulatory compatibility – may lead the regulators away 
from the previously agree regulatory standards” (Alemanno A., 2015, pp. 20). Therefore, it was 
further emphasized that TTIP’s bilateral cooperation mechanism requires legitimate and 
accountable process. This can be satisfied through an inclusive, truly multi-stakeholder 
advisory process that must be comprised of representatives of citizen, consumer and public 
interest groups who are nominated by these sectors through a public process (Alemanno A., 
2015).  
Nevertheless, it is vital to state that the introductory chapter (first section – ‘General notes’) of 
the EU proposal assures that the current text proposal “represents an initial draft which will 
need to be completed and refined by more detailed proposals in a number of areas” (EC-
Proposal, 2015, pp. 1). Thus, in accordance with this statement, the anxiety or disarray of 
many scholars arguing that the proposal appears to neglect some important areas is rather 
premature. It was stressed by the EC that there is a need for comprehensive discussion in 
many important areas. Moreover, this proposal has hinted a possible resolution of very 
controversial debate on the dispute settlement system (in other textbooks described as 
Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in TTIP. The concept of ISDS mechanism, its 
implications on signatory states and the recent innovative proposal on alternative mechanism 
are going to be discussed in detail in following chapter.   
 
8. Investor State Dispute Settlement - ISDS 
 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) usually give a wide range of protection to foreign 
investors against the actions taken by the state in which they invest in. In any kind of investment 
agreements a country has to agree upon a number of limited rules - called ‘investment 
protection standards’ - on how to legally treat its foreign investors. One of those enforcement 
mechanisms is also Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). Regarding TTIP negotiations, 
ISDS has drawn one of the most controversially debated among politicians, civil society 
organizations, lobbies, lawyers, intellectual public and general public. As this part of the TTIP 
negotiations have been one of the hottest topics, it is going to be discussed in greater details 
in this chapter.  
It is going to be introduce an overview of ‘traditional’ ISDS model that is incorporated in most 
of the BITs. It will be portrayed an escalating use and/or abuse of ISDS mechanism by the 
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foreign investors in the last decade as well as the consequences of such trials are going to be 
highlighted. Moreover, it is going to be discussed a gradual development of the traditional 
protection ISDS mechanism towards the new EU approach. Finally, this chapter is going reveal 
the current proposal of an alternative protection mechanism in TTIP. 
The dispute settlement mechanism was established in early 1960’s. The main purpose was to 
guarantee the foreign investors to obtain a compensation if their investments – factories, mines 
or land – were expropriated. In the third-countries with unreliable domestic court systems the 
expropriation was likely to occur, thereby, the establishment of such mechanism was 
welcomed (Stiftung, 2014, pp. 3-4). Nowadays, ISDS mechanism is broadly used in 
international investment agreements to safeguard that commitments, which countries have 
made to one another to protect mutual investments, are respected. By the 2014, there have 
been 3268 International Investment Agreements (IIA) (2,923 BITs and 345 “other IIAs”) 
containing ISDS provision (UNCTAD, February 2015). EU Member States account for around 
1400 of these. The key objective of ISDS mechanism is a provision of a neutral forum to resolve 
disputes between state and foreign investor. The jurisdiction of arbitral systems operates by 
the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Stiftung, 2014, pp. 3-4). 
The lawsuits cannot be invoked before domestic courts as the International Investment 
Agreements (IIA) are part of the international legal system (EC, March 2015). In this regard, 
ISDS mechanism has been widely criticised as “the investors are able to ‘leapfrog’ domestic 
courts” (BFoGP, 2014, pp. 74-77). Moreover, in the ISDS tribunal the disputes are judged by 
one or more arbitrators chosen by the parties. The foreign investor is entitled to a monetary 
compensation in the situation when he is able to prove that the measures taken by the host 
state has violated the investment treaty and caused him a significant damage such as reduced 
profits, cancellation of a contract, or changes in tax laws (EC-ISDS, March 2014).  
Furthermore, ISDS trials lack transparency as the tribunals operate behind the ‘closed doors’. 
The complaining party (a company, an association or an individual) has an absolute discretion 
to set compensation amounts, to order payment of compound interest, and to allocate costs. 
In addition, it is not compulsory for foreign investors to exhaust the domestic remedies before 
going to the ISDS tribunals, although the primary exhaustion of those remedies is an underlying 
principle of international law. As an implication of ISDS privilege the “foreign investors have 
superior substantive and procedural rights relative to domestic investors and firms” (Stiftung, 
2014, pp. 3-4).   
In addition, the monetary compensation, lawyers’ fees for processing the cases or other bills 
related to the trial, are paid out of the public purse. It was revealed by UNCTAD (2015) that, in 
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2014, 8 out of 42 rendered decisions were awarded. This includes a combined award of 
approximately USD 50 billion in three closely related cases, the highest known award by far in 
the history of investment arbitration (UNCTAD, February 2015, pp. 7-8). UNCTAD (February 
2015) has examined claims and awards across a large number of ISDS cases. It was found 
out that on average states were significantly more successful than investors - from the total 
number of 356 concluded cases by 2014 - 37% (132 cases) had been decided in favour of the 
State, while 25% (87 cases) were found in favour of the investor, with monetary compensation 
awarded (UNCTAD, February 2015, pp. 8). Nevertheless, despite the proportionally greater 
success of the state it was underscored that “under the ISDS regime, only investors can initiate 
suits and while governments have obligations to investors, there is no reciprocal responsibility 
for investors with respect to host governments” (Stiftung, 2014, pp. 2). 
Last but not least, in the last decade the investment lawyers and corporations has been using 
the threat of legal cases trying to alter inconvenient policies or prevent proposed measures 
and regulations that could negatively affect their profits (Olivet and Eberhardt, March, 2014). 
Generally speaking, as a consequence of ISDS provision in BITs, the democratic principles 
are often jeopardized by the reason that it “formally prioritizes corporate rights over the right of 
governments to regulate and the sovereign right of nations to govern their own affairs” 
(Stiftung, 2014, pp. 4). This effect is also known as “regulatory chill”. On this account, enforcing 
the ISDS trials has had damaging and direct impacts on peoples’ daily lives and on overall 
wellbeing. Additionally, international firms are increasingly abusing ISDS privilege to attack a 
loads of policies, in particular food safety, natural resource, agricultural, financial, 
environmental, tobacco and other policies.  
The number of initiated ISDS lawsuits have experienced boom in the last fifteen years (see 
Appendix III). Since the 1960s – when the first Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with ISDS 
provision were established – until 2000, there were barely 50 ISDS cases in total. However, 
since 2001 onwards the ISDS arbitrations have been sharply rising to the total number of 608 
ISDS cases (of which 356 cases were concluded), at the end of 2014, not including numerous 
cases that are kept out of the public eye (UNCTAD, February 2015). This enormous increase 
by twelve-fold in just 14 years can be interpreted as a rising abuse of the investor’s privilege 
to sue the host state in the situations they feel that the new or proposed measures or regulation 
may contribute to the reduce profit.  
8.1 A Proposal to Include ISDS in TTIP 
As any other BITs also TTIP must include some sort of investment protection standards in 
order to ensure a fair legal treatment of foreign investors as well as to encourage and protect 
the high volume of EU investment in the US and, reciprocally, the investments held by the US 
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in the EU. On 17 June 2013, the mandate for negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) was provided to the European Commission by the 
28 EU Member States. It was stated this agreement should include investment protection and 
Investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS), providing that certain conditions would be fulfilled 
(TTIP-Mandate, 2014). 
Although the official version of the TTIP mandate was released on 9 October 2014 by the 
European Commissioner Karel de Gucht (TTIP-Mandate, 2014), it was in early June 2013, 
when leaked texts of the first drafts of the EU negotiating mandate were being published and 
freely accessible online on various of websites (see for example a draft on Netzpolitik.org, 
2013). The pronounced statement that TTIP agreement will most likely encompass the ISDS 
provision has led to an increasing opposition from public and civil society organizations. 
The following subchapter is going to outline the past attempts made by the EU to reform the 
traditional ISDS mechanism as well as the current proposals of the new approach of ISDS 
provision in TTIP is going to be discussed. 
8.2 ISDS’s reform is desirable 
Europe is a place where the international investment rules, including investment protection 
standards and ISDS, were invented. As noted above, traditional ISDS system was established 
more than a century ago, and since then this ‘old’ dispute settlement mechanism has not 
experienced any significant change. However, as soon as foreign investors recognized the 
weakness of the mechanism and the possibility of its exploitation the number of the ISDS 
claims have been rising rapidly (see Appendix III). This was probably a signal for the EU that 
recognized the need for a substantial reform of the traditional approach to the strong 
investment protection and the associated ISDS system. The most challenging task is to find a 
right balance between investors’ protection and the reinsurance of states’ autonomy. The 
reform must ensure that the aim to protect and encourage investment does not affect the ability 
of the EU and the Members to regulate in pursue of legitimate public policy objectives. 
Moreover, it is required to set up the ISDS system transparent and independent. The 
opportunity for profound reform was triggered in 2009, when “the Lisbon Treaty conferred 
competence for the protection of investments to the EU” (EC-TTIP&ISDS, May 2015, pp. 1).  
The EU has initiated the revision of the system through the process of negotiations concerning 
the new generation of EU trade agreements that encompass the investment protection and 
ISDS. The new approach in terms of investment protection rules and ISDS mechanism was 
introduced in 2014, when the FTA between the EU and Singapore, and the EU and Canada 
(CETA) were concluded. This reform includes such change as preservation of partners’ right 
to regulate, precise definition of the key concepts like ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or ‘indirect 
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expropriation’ in order to prevent abuse, mandatory transparency, a code of conduct for 
arbitrators, prohibition of parallel proceeding – claims initiated in two different venues i.e. 
domestic court and ISDS, ‘loser pays principle’, and possible creation of appeal mechanism 
(EC-TTIP&ISDS, May 2015). 
TTIP negotiations, in general, have been associated with an increasing opposition. Moreover, 
the proposal to include ISDS in TTIP was met with fierce resistance from the intellectual and 
general public, anti-globalization NGOs or leftist politicians within the EU Parliament. In these 
circumstances, an online petition was set up to ‘stop these sinister trade deals’ (referring to 
TTIP and CETA). Eventually, it was collected a total number of 3,284,289 signatures (Stop-
TTIP, 15 October 2015). As a result of the increasing resistance, the EU in 2014 took a decision 
to suspend the negotiations on TTIP and open an online public consultation that would be held 
between 27 March and 13 July 2014. The objective of the consultation was to identify a 
possible innovative approach to investment protection and ISDS in the TTIP. 
The online public consolation drew unprecedented interest. By the 13 July 2014 the EU 
Commission received in total 149.399 of submissions (see the complete statistical report EC-
ISDS Consultation, July 2014). Subsequently, on 13 January 2015, the report on the results of 
the consultation was released (see the final report: EC-ISDS Consultation results, January 
2015). Four key areas were identified where further improvements to the EU’s approach were 
required. The proposal included: 1) the protection of right to regulate; 2) the establishment and 
functioning of arbitral tribunals; 3) the review of ISDS decisions through an appeal mechanism; 
4) the relationship between domestic judicial system and ISDS (EC-ISDS Consultation results, 
January 2015, pp. 8-28) Moreover, the EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström in her 
concept paper ‘Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform’ (EC-TTIP&ISDS, May 
2015) stressed that the EU should pursue creation of a permanent court and a bilateral 
appellate mechanism. Nevertheless, after protracted consultations and the best efforts of C. 
Malmström (a great supporter of ISDS) most of the Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) remained unconvinced and wary of such a mechanism. It was pointed out that the new 
proposal was "a step in the right direction but it still does not go far enough to restore public 
confidence on this issue” (The Parliament Magazine, May 2015). 
Given the public objection and the MEPs' opposition to ISDS the ongoing detailed discussions 
with Member States, the European Parliament, national parliaments and stakeholders have 
been conducted. The latest proposal, as at the date of writing this chapter, took place on 16 
September 2015 when a new ‘Investment Court System’ was submitted by the EU Trade 
Commissioner Malmström for consideration. As presented, a new Investment Court System 
would be established in order to replace the current investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
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mechanism in all ongoing and future EU investment negotiations, including TTIP. This new 
system should ensure the governments’ right to regulate in public interest through transparent 
and accountable manners. It is suggested that the major elements for improvement would 
include: the establishment of a public Investment Court System; a requirement for highly 
qualified judges (not arbitrators) who would be publicly appointed in advance; a guarantee of 
no conflict of interest; high transparency of the system – it is suggested that all documents 
would be made online and all hearings would be opened to the public; last but not least, a new 
Appeal Tribunal, operating on similar principles to the WTO Appellate Body, would be 
established. It is deemed that this new Investment Court System will restore public confidence 
in investor dispute mechanism once it is highly transparent, accountable and subject to 
democratic principles (EC-Investment Court System, September 2015; Malmström, 
September 2015). 
Last but not least, it was noted that the EU Commission will start working, along with other 
countries, on the creation of a permanent International Investment Court. Its future goal is to 
“replace all investment dispute resolution mechanisms provided in EU agreements, EU 
Member States’ agreements with third countries and in trade and investment treaties 
concluded between non-EU countries” (EC-Investment Court System, September 2015).  
This new proposal will be submitted and discussed with the EU’s Member States and the 
European Parliament, and as soon as the round of discussions are completed the formal EU 
text proposal will be presented to the US (Malmström, September 2015). It is still difficult to 
estimate the final date and the form of the proposal taking into consideration that this issue is 
extremely controversial as far as democratic principles are concerned.  
 
9. The Economic Impact of TTIP 
 
The above noted chapters shed a light on the main challenges of the TTIP negotiations. This 
section is going to introduce the main findings of the major studies trying to project what the 
mutual cooperation between the EU and the US will bring to the economies. It is going to be 
done through a brief revision of the projections of the four main pro-TTIP studies. Moreover, 
an alternative perspective on TTIP is going to be discussed.  
The TTIP agreement is accompanied with series of ex-ante economic analysis projecting its 
effect on the global economies. The impact assessment of TTIP has been exceptionally difficult 
as it is an unusual and ambitious bilateral trade agreement. Not only because of the enormous 
economic size of the two partners and their current economic relationship (which roughly 
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accounts for a half of the world GDP), but also because of the nature of the TTIP agreement. 
This kind of new FTA particularly focus on NTBs reduction (non-tariff barriers - mostly 
‘regulatory barriers’) and the regulatory coherence, by the reason that these differences 
between the US and the EU create the most significant costs for market access. In this regard, 
it was stated that “the regulatory core of the TTIP makes it extremely difficult for economists to 
come to grips with the expected economic meaning of the outcome of the negotiations” (EPRS, 
2014, pp. 1) 
The European Commission (EC) is the main advocate of the TTIP agreement in Europe. Its 
advocacy and projections are primarily based on findings of the background study conducted 
by the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). CEPR’s report (2013) is built upon 
a detailed study conducted by Ecorys (2009). Ecorys (2009) benchmarked the existing level 
of NTBs between the EU and the US. The results of this study pointed out a substantial gain 
for both parties providing that the NTBs are diminished (Ecorys, 2009). CEPR analysis (2013) 
has applied for the economic assessment of the impact of the EU-US bilateral trade agreement 
the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model ‘GTAP’ while using current dataset. The 
same model has been applied by Ecorys (2009). It includes the GTAP8 database that provides 
a strong and continuously updated source of the data (projected to 2027), more recent trade 
and tariff information as well as existing investment income data from Eurostat. Moreover, 
CEPR (2013) worked on the basis of the NTB estimates reported in the Ecorys (2009) study 
(CEPR, 2013).  
9.1 Methodology assessment  
The European Parliamentary Research Study (EPRS), in April 2014, published a report that 
examines the appropriateness and validity of the methodology that lie behind the EC’s impact 
assessment of TTIP. It is noteworthy that this study was conducted after the opening of the 
TTIP negotiations. 
According to the EPRS (2014) the CGE model applied by CEPR (2013) and many other studies 
(such as Ecorys, 2009; CEPII, 2013; and Bertelsmann Stifftung, 2013) correspond to the 
analytical needs of the impact assessment of TTIP. Moreover, it was emphasized that “there 
are indeed no better alternatives to assess the impacts of trade agreements than the CGE 
modelling” (EPRS, 2014, pp. 51). However, it was also admitted that this model has some 
specific drawbacks, especially when assessing deep trade agreements such as the one 
between the EU and the US, which is mainly based on (partial) removal of non-tariffs measures 
(EPRS, 2014, pp. 51). Moreover, the unreliability of the model was confirmed, in 2008, in a 
study conducted by UNCTAD (2008). It analysed the appropriateness in application of CGE 
models, particularly GTAP, when measuring the impact of NTBs reduction on economies. It 
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was demonstrated that “while using the same robust estimates of NTB incidence [researchers] 
obtain vastly different results under different model specifications” (UNCTAD, 2008, pp. iii) 
EPRS concluded, however, that since better alternative tools were not applicable to estimate 
the long-term impacts of such a complicated trade agreement the CGE models have been 
used by most of the TTIP analysis (EPRS, 2014). Last but not least, these models are also 
criticized by the Austrian Foundation for Development and Research (OFSE, 2014). It is 
claimed that the underlying hypothesis of the CGE models (both GTAP and MIRACE) include 
(i) full employment of factors, including labour, (ii) price clearing markets and (iii) a constant 
government deficit. Therefore, it is stressed that the assumptions based on this models are 
unrealistic (OFSE, 2014, VIII). 
The EPRS report (2014) and OFSE report (2014) also compares the assumptions and findings 
of other studies on EU trade and investment agreements regarding their methodologies and 
assumptions. It is pointed out that the final outcome (in terms of GDP gains) do not vary 
dramatically compared to the CEPR (2013) findings (EPRS, 2014; OFSE, 2014). Interestingly 
enough, CGE models are applied by all four ‘pro-TTIP studies’ – implying: Ecorys (2009), 
CEPR (2013), CEPII (2013) and Bertelsmann/GED (June 2013).  
 
9.2 The estimated positive outcome 
CEPR, as a credible research organization, has been appointed to conduct a study that 
explores current transatlantic trade and investment flows and existing barriers to these. It has 
been used CGE economic modelling ‘GTAP’ to estimate the potential impact of different policy 
scenarios. The final report from 2013 called ‘Reducing Transatlantic Barrier to Trade and 
Investments’ estimates significant and beneficial impact by removing tariff and especially non-
tariff barriers to transatlantic trade and investment relation. The two scenarios have been taken 
into consideration – first scenario estimates the net-gains when only specific tariffs are 
reduced; second scenario predict the net-gains by adopting ambitious comprehensive trade 
agreement and investment liberalization. It was concluded a positive and a significant gains 
for both the EU and the US, as well as for the whole world economy. Moreover, the estimated 
outcome suggests that the second scenario - the comprehensive tariff and non-tariff reduction 
- would bring much greater benefits to both economies as well as to the global economy 
(CEPR, 2013). 
The key findings of CEPR (2013) outlined that TTIP will bring: 1) In case of a less ambitious 
agreement (reduction of 10 per cent in trade costs from NTBs and nearly full tariff removal - 
98 per cent of tariffs) it is expected an extra GDP of €68 billion for the EU and €49.5 billion for 
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the US. 2) In case of ambitious comprehensive scenario (elimination of 25 per cent of NTB 
related costs and 100 per cent of tariffs) would contribute to an extra €119 billion for the EU 
economy, €95 billion for the US economy and €99 billion for the rest of the world. These 
findings can be translated to an extra €545 in disposable income annually for a four-member 
family in the EU, on average, and €655 per family in the US. Furthermore, the CEPR calculates 
an increased level of economic activity and productivity gains created by the agreement. The 
EU and the US labour markets will benefit in terms of overall wages and new job opportunities 
for high and low skilled workers. Regarding total exports, it is estimated an increase by 6 per 
cent in the EU and by 8 per cent in the US (CEPR, 2013). 
In accordance with these findings, it was stressed that major attention of the transatlantic 
economies should be paid to the reduction and elimination of NTBs to trade as these are critical 
to the logic of transatlantic liberalization. The same regulatory challenges which both partners 
face are approached differently and this result in increasing costs for firms, and so dragging 
down labour productivity. It was further stated that TTIP will create a magnificent opportunity 
to eliminate these NTBs by a composition of cross-recognition and regulatory convergence of 
different regulations (CEPR, 2013) 
Another important empirical analysis considers a private foundation Bertelsmann Stiftung. The 
study examines the impact of TTIP on the global economy, in particular, on German economy. 
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) has been applied to analysis the impact of a new 
bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the US. In spite of other analysis, in which a 
commercially available modelling framework ‘GTAP’ has been used – namely, Ecorys (2009) 
and CEPR (2013) and two other studies1, a different approach has been chosen by 
Bertelsmann/GED. The model is based on a simulated scenario, computed on the basis of 
existing agreements (e.g. the EU, NAFTA). This approach, however, was proclaimed by EPRS 
(2014) to be “clearly unrealistic” - considering the fact that the predicted percentage change in 
terms of GDP are very high in comparison with the other three pro-TTIP studies (see EPRS, 
2014, pp. 55). 
In the final report (Bertelsmann/GED, June 2013), it is predicted that a bilateral free-trade 
agreement between the USA and the EU will have an important welfare effect on the countries 
which are directly involved and also on countries that are only indirectly affected by the 
agreement. The study considers two scenarios: ‘Tariff scenario’- a reduction to zero or virtually 
                                               
1 Regarding the EU-US bilateral FTA, there have been published two other studies - a study conducted 
with a specific focus on Swedish economy (Kommerskollegium, 2012), and on Austrian economy 
(Francois and Pindyuk, 2013). While further discussion of these analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is worth pointing out that both reports came into a very similar conclusion, i.e. both the EU and 
the US economies would benefit from this agreement.  
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zero for all goods and services, and a ‘Comprehensive liberalization scenario’ – reduction of 
NTBs: by mutual recognition of different standards, by harmonization or by elimination of 
unnecessary measures. On the one hand, in the case of the comprehensive liberal scenario, 
it is estimated a large real per capita income changes especially for the US and the EU. The 
trade between Germany and the US would gradually rise up to 90 per cent. In addition, the 
real per capita income in Germany is estimated to increase by 4.68 per cent 
(Bertelsmann/GED, June 2013, pp. 23- 26). It is also predicted that TTIP will contribute to a 
rise of employment in the USA and the EU. The projections also suggest substantial increase 
in real pre-capita income, especially for the US (Bertelsmann/GED, June 2013, pp. 30-43). On 
the other hand, it is projected a sharp decline in the intra EU trade, in particular, the trade 
between Germany and BRICS countries, between Germany and other EU countries 
(especially France). Moreover, the EU trade with neighbouring states in North Africa or Eastern 
Europe would diminished. It is also predicted that TTIP would also lead to the job losses in 
some countries, particularly in Canada (100 000 lost jobs). Therefore, it is believed that these 
countries will have strong incentives to participate in negotiating the liberalization of non-tariff 
barriers.  
Next important analysis concerns CEPII, a French research centre in international economics. 
CEPII in September 2013 commissioned its own study to examine the impact of the new EU-
US bilateral FTA on both economies. Moreover, its second objective was to verify the figures 
obtained by EC’s background study conducted by CEPR (2013). The Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model ‘MIRAGE’ developed by CEPII has been used to carry out such an 
assessment. The analysis estimates that TTIP would also contribute to considerable gains in 
terms of GDP. The estimates are comparatively lower than those of CEPR (2013) or 
Bertelsmann/GED (June 2013) but still pronounced. It was found out that, in the long run, both 
partners by cutting the tariff and especially non-tariff barriers would reap non-negligible GDP 
gains. On average, the annual long run GDP gains would expand by $98bn for the EU and of 
$64bn for the US. Corresponding to an average long run increase by 3 per cent for both 
economies (CEPII, 2013, pp. 10). Last but not least, it was underlined that as a result of the 
spill-overs effect from trade liberalization the third parties would benefit as well (CEPII, 2013, 
pp. 11). This assumption is also expressed in CEPR (2013) report, and hence, both are 
consistent with the EU’s commitment to Policy Coherence for Development (OFSE, 2014, pp. 
6). 
9.3 Contradictory studies 
TTIP is very controversial trade agreement. Given the importance of the new EU-US bilateral 
FTA there have been published a large number of studies trying to project the final outcome 
of the TTIP agreement. Despite the fact that most of analysis have been conducted by different 
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institutions many of them concluded that this new trade agreement would be beneficial for the 
EU, the US and the world economy. Nevertheless, the promising results have been challenged 
by other studies pointing out that these estimates ought to be rather unrealistic - in terms of 
obtained figures, but most importantly, selected CGE econometric models. 
In the line with above noted ‘pro-TTIP’ studies, which were commissioned by the EU 
Commission (OFSE, 2014, pp V), particularly, Ecorys (2009), CEPR (2013), CEPII (2013) and 
Bertelsmann/GED (2013), there have been published other independent analysis that predict 
an adverse effect of TTIP on economy. The report published by researchers from Austrian 
Foundation for Development Research (OFSE, 2014) and the Global Development and 
Environment Institute (GDAE, 2014) critically assess the findings of the four ‘pro-TTIP’ studies 
and their underlying methodology. Moreover, GDAE offers its own analysis of the potential 
impact of TTIP on the two economies while using different econometrics modelling.   
First of all, it is argued that even in the most optimistic liberalization scenarios of the four official 
studies the gains in terms of GDP, trade flows, and real wages in the EU and the US are 
positive but relatively small, extra GDP growth in a range from 0.3 to 1.3 per cent. Moreover, 
it is stressed that these positive effect refers to the cumulative GDP growth, thus, this change 
is expected in the course of 10 years. Consequently, the extra annual GDP growth during this 
transition period would account for merely 0.03 to 0.13 per cent, in the ambitious 
comprehensive scenario (OFSE, 2014). Moreover, it was pointed out that the predicted results 
of TTIP stands on rather unrealistic assumptions and on inadequate methods. “Projections by 
different institutions have been shown to rely on the same Computable General Equilibrium 
model that has proven inadequate as a tool for trade policy analysis” (GDAE, 2014, pp. 2). A 
hesitation about this model, with regard to TTIP, has been also expressed by EPRS (EPRS, 
2014, pp. 51). Furthermore, it is stressed that the EC’s reference to CEPR (2013) an 
‘independent report’ seems to be quite misleading as it is evident that EC was a client for whom 
the study has been produced (GDAE, 2014, pp. 5).  
According to the OFSE report (2014), there are some important issues that have been 
frequently neglected by trade impact assessments in the main four studies. It is stressed that 
although TTIP agreement is intended to have a positive effect on total exports, there are 
concealed trade diversion effects. Researches from OFSE (2014) and GDAE (2014) are 
convinced that particularly intra-EU trade will be negatively affected by the cheaper imports 
from the US (OFSE, 2014, pp.15; GDAE, 2014, pp. 7). Furthermore, it is predicted an adverse 
effect on the global trade, particularly on developing countries such as Latin America, Sub-
Saharan Africa or Low Income Countries. A negative impact on the third countries is also 
reported by Bertelsmann/GED report (June 2013). These assumptions appear to be a potential 
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violation of the EU’s commitment to Policy Coherence for Development as they undermine the 
EU commitment to reduce poverty in developing countries (OFSE, 2014, pp. 6-7).  
OFSE (2014) also argues that the adjustment costs are generally ignored by the most of the 
‘pro-TTIP’ studies. As a consequence, in order to provide more realistic insight, OFSE (2014) 
in its final report considers these costs of TTIP. Firstly, it is pointed out the tariffs (currently 
around 2 per cent) elimination will contribute to the revenue losses for the EU budget of about 
€20bn over the transition period of 10 years (OFSE, 2014, pp. V). Moreover, it is stressed that 
although CEPR (2013) study expects workers temporary displacement, none of the main 
studies have taken into account a permanent unemployment. Another type of costs that have 
been generally disregarded by main ‘pro-TTIP’ studies, particularly Ecorys (2009), concern 
social costs. It is pointed out that NTBs elimination, harmonization and mutual recognition will 
result in a potential welfare loss to society. It is explained that NTBs elimination threatens public 
policy goals such as environmental safety, consumer safety and public health (including GMO 
products, hormone beef, chickens washed in chlorine, chemicals in cosmetics etc.) (OFSE, 
2014, pp. VI). On contrary, Ecorys (2009), assume that a reduction of NTBs is welfare-
enhancing as a result of cheaper imported products (Ecorys, 2009, pp. 18). 
In order to provide an alternative assessment of the effect of TTIP the Austrian research centre 
GDAE (2014) conveyed its own analysis using different model - the United Nations Global 
Policy Model (GPM)2. While taking into consideration current economic situation of protracted 
austerity, relatively high unemployment, low growth especially in the EU and US and increasing 
pressure on labour incomes it is assumed that TTIP would further hamper economic activity 
and could lead to a deeper crisis. The projections of the TTIP impact on global economy differs 
dramatically compared to the four main ‘pro-TTIP’ studies. GDAE (2014) report has shown that 
TTIP would lead to: losses in terms of net exports after a decade, compared to the baseline 
“no-TTIP” scenario; net losses in terms of GDP; a loss of labour income (particularly in France); 
job losses - approximately 600,000 jobs would be lost in the EU; a reduction of the labour 
share; a loss of government revenue and thus Government deficits would also increase as a 
percentage of GDP in every EU country; higher financial instability and accumulation of 
imbalances; and increase of EU vulnerability to any crisis coming from the US (see full report 
GDAE, 2014, pp. 2-3).  
To summarize the results from all presented analysis there is no clear-cut consensus on the 
potential effect of TTIP on the economy. 
                                               
2 The GPM is a demand-driven, global econometric model. The dataset applied in this model is based 
on a consistent macroeconomic data for every country. Moreover, its estimations consider a level of 
employment using International Labour Organization data. Last but not least, projections of this model 
“necessarily make assumptions on the way economies will stabilize after a policy change” i.e. after 
initiation of TTIP. (GDAE, 2014, pp. 10) 
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10. Transparency and Public opinion on TTIP 
 
Although TTIP is considered to be the major bilateral trade agreement in the history, its 
negotiations are held in considerable secrecy. In this regard, the EU Trade Commissioner 
Karel de Gucht (2013) was arguing that “a certain level of confidentiality is needed in the 
negotiations for the EU to succeed and reach its objectives” (BFoGP, 2014, pp. 22). This 
argument is somewhat in contradiction to the fact that transparency is a fundamental 
democratic principle. The lack of officially available information, concerning NTBs, makes it 
difficult for the public to identify and/or influence many important policy areas, such as 
environmental aspects, health, food safety, chemicals in cosmetics and several other areas. 
Insufficient public communication and unavailability of information in mass-media, especially 
in the initial phases of the TTIP negotiations, contributed to a lot of speculations about what is 
happening behind the closed door. After a year of intense debate and opposition, in November 
2014, a Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström stated her intentions to make the TTIP 
negotiations more transparent (EC-Transparency, November 2014). The first official texts were 
published on 7 January 2015, one and a half year after the TTIP negotiations started.  
A standard Eurobarometer survey held in autumn 2014 and spring 2015, conducted by TNS - 
one of the largest research agencies worldwide, at the request of the European Commission. 
It was found that, in spring 2015, 56 per cent of Europeans support a free trade and investment 
agreement between the EU and the US (this corresponds to a decline by - 2 per cent since fall 
2014). The opposition towards such an agreement was expressed by 28 per cent (+3), while 
16 per cent (-1) answered that they “don’t know”. Thus, it can be stated that the opposition has 
been slightly growing. Nevertheless, in general, the EU supports this mutual EU-US trade 
agreement. On the other hand, there were exceptions like Austria with the lowest support of 
23 per cent only (a decline by -16 percentage points from fall 2014), while 67 per cent is 
“against”. The second lowest support was expressed in Germany. Only 31 per cent (-8) of 
respondents were in favour, while opponents reached 51 per cent (+10). Luxembourg showed 
support of 37 per cent (-3) vs opposition 49 (-6) – the third lowest position.  In total, support 
has fallen in 14 Member States, strengthened in nine countries and remained stable in five 
(see also Appendix V -  a map from November 2014 displaying the EU Members and their 
support for TTIP) (Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015) 
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Figure 2 – Standard EuroBarometer – public opinion on TTIP spring 2015 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015, pp. 35 
 
In April 2014 as well as in May 2015, Pew Research Centre observed public opinion in the US 
and Germany about TTIP. The support of TTIP in Germany has been falling. Only 41 per cent 
of Germans think that TTIP would be beneficial for their country. This number represents a 
deterioration by 14 percentage points compared to the Pew Research Centre survey from April 
2014 (see Table 1).  
On the other hand, 36 per cent of Germans believe that TTIP would not be beneficial for their 
country. From this group of people, 61 per cent fear that TTIP would negatively affect food, 
environmental and auto safety standards. Whereas 18 per cent are concerned that TTIP would 
give to foreign companies that invest in Germany undue advantages. While merely 17 per cent 
are afraid of losing job or a decrease in workers’ wages as a result of TTIP. 
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In the US 21 per cent of respondents believe that TTIP will not be profitable for their country. 
Among those Americans who are not supporters of TTIP, 50 per cent fear of potentially adverse 
impact on jobs and wages, 22 per cent expect unfair advantage for foreign investors, and 12 
per cent are concerned of lower US food standards as a result of TTIP - see Figure 3 (PEW, 
May 2015).  
Table 1 – US/German Survey – Public Opinion on TTIP  
 
Source: PEW, May 2015 
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Figure 3 – US/German Survey – Public Opinion on TTIP 
 
Source: PEW, May 2015 
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11.  Conclusion 
 
The formal negotiations between the EU and the US on TTIP started in July 2013. TTIP is an 
agreement designed to boost economy, increase trade and investments between the EU and 
the US – these two economies together accounts for a half of world GDP. Among economists 
it is generally accepted that trade liberalization is beneficial, as it enables better allocation of 
economic resources. Greater trade liberalization between the EU and the US will allow both 
regions and their states to specialize in production of goods in which they have comparative 
advantage (for these goods the opportunity cost of production is lower). As a result of deeper 
trade liberalization, more consumption opportunities will become available as well as the final 
prices will fall. In addition, the new trade theory also shows that even if there is no specialization 
in particular production, free trade will constitute to an increase in variety of goods. Moreover, 
the deeper integration of the Western regions is expected to counterbalance the strength of 
other economic powers, first and foremost growing China. 
Unlike conventional FTAs, TTIP is a new kind of FTA focusing on both tariff and particularly 
non-tariff barriers (NTB) removal. The main objective of the TTIP is to harmonise the different 
regulations and standards on both sides of Atlantic. It is expected that the regulatory coherence 
will boost the EU-US investments and increase transatlantic trade. It is calculated that the 
potential benefits of TTIP for both regions would be substantial, and thus “the costs involved 
may still be mitigated or reduced through partial regulatory convergence and cross-recognition 
of standards” (CEPR, 2013, pp. 9). However, many regulations on both sides of Atlantic cannot 
be simply removed since they have been established to serve legitimate domestic purposes. 
Moreover, providing that the legislative frameworks between the EU and the US, in terms of 
underlying values and approach, differ considerably, it is extremely difficult and sometimes 
nearly impossible to make the systems more compatible and coherent. This incompatibility of 
different systems and NTBs disparity across the sectors, confirm the sensitivity in the TTIP 
negotiations. It is also suggested that TTIP will emerge as a ‘living agreement’. As soon as 
TTIP is implemented there may be identified new areas of cooperation. In order not to re-open 
the initial international agreement neither to modify EU-US institutional frameworks, a new 
mechanism called regulatory cooperation will be established. The principal objective of this 
new concept is a permanent bilateral regulatory cooperation based on identifying, facilitating 
and increasing the level of future regulatory compatibility and convergence between the EU 
and the US, where feasible.  
In the section eight of this paper, a particular attention is paid to the ISDS mechanism. It is 
outlined that ISDS was primarily set up, more than a half-century ago, to protect foreign 
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investors operating in the third countries. However, this protection mechanism was lately 
embedded in most of the FTAs, including FTAs between two developed countries. However, 
since the foreign investors recognized weaknesses of this system, they have started abusing 
it. From 2001 onwards, the number of initiated ISDS cases, especially within developed 
countries, have skyrocketed. This mechanism empowers foreign investors and corporations to 
attack domestic policies. When investors feel that the new policy or regulation are threats to 
their property rights or investments they are allowed, on the basis of ISDS, to litigate against 
the state. Moreover, they are entitled to a monetary compensation if they able to prove that the 
measures taken by the host state has violated the investment treaty and caused him a 
significant damage. Current ISDS system thus hampers the ability of states to ‘freely’ generate 
new policies and to regulate in public interest, since the state firstly consider whether the new 
regulation or policy do not harm its foreign investors. Baring this in mind, the possible inclusion 
of ISDS into TTIP has evoked the major disagreement in the TTIP negotiations. As a result of 
increasing opposition, the negotiators have initiated a discussion to reform this mechanism or 
to find an alternative solution to protect foreign investors. The last proposal the ‘Investment 
Court System’ was submitted in the middle of September 2015 by EU Trade Commissioner 
Malmström. This new system is based on certain elements such as high transparency, 
accountability, a guarantee of no conflict of interest, and establishment of a new Appeal 
Tribunal. Last but not least, it should guarantee the governments’ right to regulate in public 
interest. 
The last section of this paper overlooks the main empirical studies of TTIP - their findings and 
methodology were summarized and compared. It combines both the main ‘pro-TTIP’ studies, 
namely: Ecorys (2009), CEPR (2013), CEPII (2013) and Bertelsmann/GED (June 2013), and 
two other alternative analysis, particularly OFSE and GDAE, that assess critically the findings 
and the underlying methodology. According to the ‘pro-TTIP’ studies, TTIP will be beneficial 
for the EU, the US and global economy in terms of GDP growth. Furthermore, it will enhance 
competition, as well as it will increase export and import, job creation and overall wages. These 
findings, especially those of CEPR (2013), are also the main argument of the EC while 
presenting TTIP’s benefits. On the other hand, all these four analysis are criticized by Austrian 
Research Foundation OFSE and by US Global Development and Environmental Institute 
GDAE. It is argued that all four ‘pro-TTIP’ studies have used the same underlying methodology 
(the CGE model - GTAP and MIRACE) that is considered to be inappropriate, and thus, their 
assumptions (GDAE, 2014; OFSE, 2014). In addition, GDAE commissioned its own alternative 
analysis in order to provide unbiased estimates. Applying different model (GPM), it has been 
concluded that TTIP will mostly have negative effect on export, jobs, wages, government 
revenue, financial stability, social and environmental costs etc. What is more, it is stressed that 
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neither of the four ‘pro-TTIP’ analysis has considered the adjustment costs, such as social and 
environmental costs, in the calculation of TTIP’s outcome.  
TTIP is an exceptional bilateral trade agreement that pursues to liberalise two biggest 
economic players in the world. Considering the magnitude and the gravity of such an 
agreement, its negotiations give a unique opportunity to reconsider the current ‘old’ paradigm 
of FTAs. Moreover, it provides a room for establishment of a new futuristic model that may 
serve as an example for forthcoming FTAs. An evidence for such an assumption regards the 
TTIP negotiations on, for instance, ISDS mechanism or regulatory cooperation body. Last but 
not least, in certain areas, particularly ISDS, it has been shown the power and the significance 
of civil society and of the public voices. Therefore, it can be further anticipated that the final 
form of TTIP will be, to some extent, based on the direct input of civil society, thus, in 
accordance with democratic principles.  
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Appendix I 
Figure 4 – Export Soybean and Soymeal to the EU in 2013 
 
 
 
 
Source: EC-GMOs, 2015 
 
The map represents data from 2013, 32 million tonnes of soymeal and soybean (96% of EU 
consumption from which 90% was GMOs origin) were imported to the EU, where most of it 
was used as a feed for livestock  
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Appendix II 
Figure 5 - Regulatory Cooperation Under TTIP  
Source: BEUC, 2015 
Figure 5 represents a draft of horizontal structure of regulatory cooperation under TTIP. 
BEUC argues that the complicated structure is likely to become an impediment in pursue of 
new regulations.   
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Appendix III  
Figure 6 – Known ISDS cases, annual and cumulative (1987-2014) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, February 2015, pp. 5 
From the graph is obvious that relative ISDS claims have been dramatically increasing for the 
past decade. The most frequent accused state, in 2014, was Spain, followed by Costa Rica, 
the Czech Republic, India, Romania, Ukraine and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(UNCTAD, February 2015, pp.5) 
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Appendix IV  
 
Figure 7 - An Increase of Real per capita Income in EU Members 
 
 
Source: Bertelsmann/GED, June 2013 
 
The Figure 7 represents an estimated increase of real per capita income in the EU Member 
States. The researchers from Bertelsmann/GED assume that under comprehensive liberal 
scenario of TTIP, it is expected a significant increase of real per capita income in all EU 
Member States.  
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Appendix V 
Figure 8 - EU Members and their support for TTIP 
 
Source: PEW 2015 
The map from November 2014 displaying the EU region and particular countries and their 
support for free trade agreement with the US.   
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